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CONTENTS

THE SHAPE OF THINGS 209

EDITORIALS:

RED STAR AND SWASTIKA 211

EDUCATION AGAINST DEMOCRACY 212

FINLAND BETWEEN TWO FIRES

by Keith Hutchison 214

RADIO CENSORS ITSELF

by Dorothy Rockwell 217

THE BRITISH CONSCIENCE

by Reinhold Niebuhr 219

IN THE WIND 221

ISSUES AND MEN by Oswald Garrison Villard 222

BOOKS AND THE ARTS:

BITTER FRUIT OF THE TREE by Sterling Brown 223

MEN AT WORK by Louis B. Salomon 223

THE FALL OF PRAGUE by Franz Hoellering 223

"A SOLEMN WILDERNESS" by Ruth Pielkova 224

BOOKS AND THE WARS by Albert Guérard 225

TOTALITARIAN WAR by Maxwell S. Stewart 225

A FRUITFUL OBSESSION by Jerome Mellquist 226

MUSIC by B. H. Haggin 226

The Shape of Things

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THE IMPACT OF THE SOVIET-GERMAN NON-aggression agreement has blown to pieces all international calculations. Its echoes resound as loudly in Chungking and Tokyo as in Danzig and London. We discuss on a later page the fateful European implications of the agreement. In Asia it may ironically have some useful by-products. Britain's rejection of Japan's basic economic demands in North China had provoked the Japanese extremists to a fresh anti-British campaign in Shanghai and the occupied section of China. In this campaign, which was obviously timed to coincide with the latest Nazi war threats in Europe, the Japanese have made no effort to conceal their hand behind the "spontaneous" anti-British demonstrations of Chinese thugs and hirelings. In some instances Japanese soldiers have herded the Chinese into anti-British mass-meetings. An incident at Shanghai in which a British policeman killed two Japanese-employed guardians of the law who had fired on him and wounded him has been seized as a pretext for new Japanese demands. It is evident that the military clique is pressing the anti-British campaign in an effort to force the government into a military alliance with the axis powers. But perhaps the time has passed when their efforts can be effective. As a result of the Soviet-Nazi pact, Japan's attention will be forcibly shifted to the Russian border, and even the military may question the wisdom of further provoking the British.

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LITTLE CAN BE SAID FOR SUMNER WELLES'S somewhat crude efforts to bludgeon the Mexican government into acceptance of the oil companies' demands with respect to their expropriated properties. Acting Secretary Welles declared that the State Department had no other purpose in intervening "than to reconcile a major difference of approach which threatens a breakdown in the present negotiations." But his assertion that a continuation of the dispute "will constitute a material barrier to the maintenance of . . . close and friendly understanding between Mexico and the United States" is the sort of threat which belongs to the dollar imperialism of the

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Coolidge days. It has been evident from the beginning that the oil companies were in no mood to enter into an equitable arrangement. During the past year they have deluged the country with malicious, highly colored propaganda against the present Mexican government. They are known to have been active in Mexican politics. Under the circumstances the State Department is under no obligation to extend a helping hand. If the oil companies knew that they had to fight their own battles without the support of the government they might find grounds for settlement in relatively short order.

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WHETHER HIS CHURCH SUPERIORS HAVE AT last rapped Coughlin's knuckles or whether the emergence of a determined opposition has frightened him is not easy to discover, but it is obvious that since his hysterical call for an American Franco the political priest has wanted nothing better than to be an offstage noise for a while. His followers in New York have split on the finer points of chicanery as well as on degrees of violence, and the more extreme members of the flock have not been faring well with the law. Five of them are standing trial in magistrate's court for street rioting, and two are being held for special sessions on the charge of having assaulted policemen. One devout follower, a woman of forty-two, was given a sentence of thirty days, later suspended, by Magistrate Michael A. Ford for selling *Social Justice* to the accompaniment of violent anti-Semitic slogans. "He who instils such ideas as you have, be he priest or anyone else," said the magistrate, "does not belong in this country. . . . I am a Catholic myself, and I am ashamed of you for the ideas you have expressed."

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IT WAS JUST AT THIS JUNCTURE THAT THE Social Distributors, a Coughlin splinter group, asked for a permit to parade through the city streets. While the police were considering the wisdom of granting it, Coughlin took two steps as revealing as they were contradictory: he disavowed any connection with the paraders, asking his followers to stay away "in the interests of law and order," and he successfully requested the leaders of the demonstration to cancel the parade, thus establishing a closer link than would have been apparent if the parade had been held. Pleading self-defense in his last radio talk, Coughlin called for a "counter-force to forefend" the attacks of the "Popular Front," but even here he spoke with one foot in the wings. He could not associate himself directly with the "counter-force," he explained, because it was his duty to "stand aloof, to preach encouragement." Coughlin can't stand too much aloof to suit us, but let him not suppose that a spotlight can't be cast backstage if need be.

FRITZ KUHN'S PERT AND UNSCRUPULOUS answers and behavior before the Dies committee remind us of Konrad Henlein, his Sudeten German colleague. In 1934 Henlein proclaimed the allegiance of his newly formed Bund to the constitution of the Czechoslovak republic. He also, of course, had nothing against the Jews. "We just want them to leave us alone," he said, exactly as Mr. Kuhn says now. Four years later Henlein revealed himself as henchman of the Leader across the border. Mr. Kuhn says: "We don't care anything about the Nazi government." Anybody who is even faintly acquainted with Nazi methods knows that Mr. Kuhn could not for a moment be the leader of the German-American Bund without the consent of the German government. He is one of its representatives in the United States, just as Henlein was in Czechoslovakia. What happened there? The authorities pretended to take seriously Henlein's lip-service to democratic principles, and the reactionary Czech agrarians helped and protected him under the same pretense, with the result that Henlein is today one of the chief slave-drivers of the enslaved Czech nation. We are not fearful lest our fellow-citizen Kuhn rule us one day in the name of Hitler. But we have numerous and powerful reactionaries of our own, as the Czechs had, who dream of future rule without the interference of democratic methods. Mr. Kuhn cannot be ignored. He serves those forces.

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THE DAIRY FARMERS' UNION WON A VICTORY in the terms agreed to by the milk companies of the New York milkshed at a conference with Mayor La Guardia. The July pool price for milk was \$1.50 a hundredweight. The union asked a guaranteed price of \$2.35. The companies have now agreed to pay \$2.15. Although August is a better month for the farmer than July and the pool price this month will probably be from \$1.70 to \$1.80 a hundredweight, the \$2.15 still represents a substantial gain. And the conference was a victory for the Dairy Farmers' Union in two other respects. For the first time the milk companies were obliged to bargain collectively with the dairy farmers—the "bargaining" provided for under the federal marketing orders supported by the milk trust is not genuine collective bargaining but bargaining between the big milk combines and the "company union" milk cooperatives controlled by them. The agreement was also a victory in that the establishment of a guaranteed price is a step away from the elaborate chicanery of the classified price plan. In their strike dairy farmers for the first time had the support of an organized consumer group, the Milk Consumers' Protective Committee, and of both C. I. O. and A. F. of L. Governor Lehman practically ordered sheriffs to hire deputies. Some of these deputies, we understand, were supplied by the milk companies.

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TVA HAS NOW TAKEN POSSESSION OF THE generating and transmission properties of the Tennessee Electric Power Company, and thirty-eight cities, towns, and cooperatives have acquired its distribution system. The price of freedom from the power trust was the good round sum of \$78,000,000, which it is generally agreed represents a very adequate valuation for the properties. It did not, however, satisfy Wendell Willkie, who, in a final blast about the evils of public competition reproduced as a full-page advertisement in many papers, complained that his holding company, Commonwealth and Southern, was only receiving about four-fifths of the real value of its Tennessee system. Actually the bondholders and preferred stockholders of the Tennessee Company are getting 100 cents on the dollar, while the common stockholders get about 30 cents and, in addition, retain an unencumbered equity in certain ice, water, and transport properties. Mr. Willkie forgot to mention this last point; nor was this the only false note in his swan-song. He took credit for the fact that the Tennessee Power Company's rates were well below the national average. It is significant, however, that in 1933, before the Authority started operations, rates were at roughly three times their present level and above the national average. However, Mr. Willkie's last blast can do no great harm except to his stockholders, who must pay for the advertisements. TVA, able at last to plan, unhampered, the electrical development of a wide area, should soon be in a position to produce the most effective possible counter-propaganda in the shape of still lower rates and higher consumption.

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THE LA FOLLETTE COMMITTEE REPORT ON the National Association of Manufacturers was released at an opportune moment—in the same week in which Teachers College, Columbia, held its Congress on Education for Democracy. The N. A. M., the report shows, has relied heavily on what it calls "educational" campaigns through press, radio, community get-togethers, and the schools. Results have been obtained by "indirection of meaning, and, in presentation, . . . secrecy and deception." "The Mandeville Press Service, the Six Star Service, Uncle Abner's cartoons, George Sokolsky's services, the 'American Family Robinson' radio broadcasts, 'Harmony Ads' by MacDonald-Cook Company, 'civic progress meetings,' and many other devices of molding public opinion have been used without disclosure of the origin and financial support by the National Association of Manufacturers." The Senate committee finds that the N. A. M. has been a major anti-union force in this country since 1903, that its activities have been expanded greatly since 1933 in fighting the New Deal, that it is now more than ever dominated by big business, that its campaign against the Wagner Act encouraged disrespect

for law, and that it is to be condemned "for cloaking its propaganda in anonymity." The association's largest contributor since 1933 has been E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company; its second largest, du Pont-controlled General Motors. Lamont du Pont represented the N. A. M. in the seminar "What Shall Be Done?" at the congress on Morningside Heights.

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THERE ARE THOSE WHO PROFESS TO SEE IN Heywood Broun the American G. K. Chesterton—witty, bluff, and firm in the faith. So proud of the man's genial humor is the *Guild Reporter* that the editors of that journal run in their current issue a column under the subhead: "Brounisms That Oiled the Convention Machinery." One Brounism escaped that column but cropped up elsewhere in the paper's coverage of the American Newspaper Guild's convention at San Francisco. Moving to strike out of an anti-Coughlin resolution a section asking the Catholic church to discipline the demagogic priest, Broun protested against considering Coughlinism "a Catholic issue," and then, in all the innocence of his fifty-odd years, remarked: "I think I might personally want to bring in a resolution that the Presbyterian church discipline Norman Thomas for certain things he has said." In the Broun parallel the Catholic church, most highly organized international in world history, is paired with the loosely knit democratic Presbyterian church; Coughlin, politically speaking, is equated with Thomas; and the Catholic priest becomes one with the layman who has had no connection with his church for more than twenty years. Malice joined with ineptitude makes for a poor brand of wit.

Red Star and Swastika

RED Star and Swastika, once mutually exclusive symbols, have come together, and the diplomatic map of Europe has been redrawn overnight. Russia has not joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, but by consenting at this precise moment to adopt the role of a disinterested neutral it has given Hitler a colossal diplomatic victory and laid foundations for another Munich. As we go to press we have only the bare fact of the agreement, announced with a blare of trumpets in Berlin, more quietly in Moscow. It remains to be seen whether the pact is to be along conventional non-aggression treaty lines or whether it will include provisions of a wider character.

We have no doubt that the Soviet government will attempt to justify itself by pointing to the untrustworthy nature of the capitalist democracies. It will recall their betrayal of Czechoslovakia, their connivance at the murder of republican Spain, their persistent cold-shouldering

of Russia up to the last few months. Only a few days ago the Soviet press reproduced an article from the London *Daily Worker* which, without offering very substantial evidence, accused Chamberlain of a new secret appeasement move. This now appears like an attempt at alibi manufacture.

We can also expect from Moscow accusations that Britain had deliberately delayed the negotiations for an Anglo-Russian pact, had engaged in them only to placate domestic opinion, and had never, in fact, intended to bring them to a conclusion. But in the light of what has happened it seems impossible to accept this version of the obstacles to agreement. Ever since April the Soviet government has been playing a double game, willing to keep the Western powers dangling but holding in reserve the well-known desire of Germany for an understanding. The dismissal of Litvinov, the champion of collective security, author of the phrase "Peace is indivisible," now appears to have been a definite swing toward isolation. It marked a determination not to be drawn into European quarrels unless Russian borders were attacked.

What needs explanation, however, is the question why Russia, after adopting a strictly nationalist policy, should have consented to negotiations with Britain at all? Was the intention to obtain better terms from Germany as the price of neutrality? Or was the Soviet government banking on a belief that Britain and France would in the end offer Poland on the altar of appeasement, thus leaving Moscow free of obligation to go to war but still in a position of moral superiority? And if so, was the pact with Germany rushed through at this critical moment because a showdown seemed imminent, with the Western powers apparently determined, after all, to stand by their obligations?

We have no sympathy for a double-crosser who has been double-crossed. Mr. Chamberlain's chickens have come home to roost. But the issues involved are far wider than the prestige of the British Premier. Soviet Russia had assumed leadership of the anti-fascist front the world over; it provided the one great hope that Germany might be rescued from the clutches of Hitler, and the rest of Europe avoid the fate of the Austrians and Czechs. And now it has timed this rapprochement with Nazism for the moment when Hitler will derive the greatest possible benefit from it. The disillusion which will follow among the left forces here and abroad will be bitter.

What of the immediate effects in Europe of this re-orientation of Moscow? Obviously the danger to Poland is intensified. Berlin is now forecasting action within the present week and is boasting that advance knowledge of this coup had enabled it to tighten the screws. Poland is protesting that it will still fight, and Britain and France are expected to reaffirm their pledges. But it also

seems likely that they will point out to Warsaw that with Russia standing aside the amount of direct aid they can give must be limited and almost certainly will not prevent Poland from being overrun. Under these circumstances, they may suggest that the Polish government attempt to negotiate.

The danger of war, however, is not past. The Poles are a recklessly romantic people, and knowing that once they yield anything to Hitler they will probably suffer the fate of the Czechs, they may choose to go down fighting. Germany, relieved of the specter of having to fight first-class armies simultaneously in east and west, may be pleased at a chance to blood its youth. Brave as the Poles are, they lack equipment, are outnumbered, and are surrounded on three sides. Germany, pursuing defensive operations in the west, could probably overwhelm them before the snows come. Then it could turn its full strength on the hated democracies with a better chance of forcing them to buy peace dearly than has hitherto seemed within its power.

Education Against Democracy

IT DOES not require extended research to understand how the Congress on Education for Democracy at Teachers College, Columbia University, came to have a good press. In Stanley Baldwin the congress had a celebrity of the first rank. The National Association of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce were prominent among the groups participating. The Teachers College Lay Council, which fathered the congress, includes Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of the *New York Times*. Its chairman is Winthrop W. Aldrich, chairman of the board of the Chase National Bank. The John Price Jones Corporation, guiding genius of the Johnstown "Citizens' Committee" in the Little Steel strike, was in charge of the publicity. No affair could have been more gratifyingly respectable; none could have been better calculated to reconcile the business community to the Teachers College in which George S. Counts once asked, "Dare the School Build a New Social Order?"

True, the C. I. O. was also on the list of sponsoring organizations, but its spokesmen made their appearance only in the catacombs of the seminars, the most important of which, "What Shall Be Done?" was closed to the press. True, John W. Studebaker, United States Commissioner of Education, was uncouth enough to obtrude wages and hours into the discussion, and two outstanding liberals, Charles A. Beard and Frank P. Graham, president of the University of North Carolina, spoke at the public sessions. Mr. Beard's presence stirred

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sardonic memories, for he left Columbia many years ago in protest against the lack of democracy on Morning-side Heights. President Graham said, "It is one of the ironies of the history of liberty that the shibboleths which came flaming from the souls of the prophets of democracy in behalf of the freedom of forgotten men in another century should be hardened and turned against the larger liberties of the forgotten millions of our time." The sentence did not appear in the news reports. It comes uncomfortably close to epitomizing the congress.

The Nation, along with other liberal organizations, accepted an invitation to take part in the congress in the belief that it would provide an open forum for all points of view. But the sessions were so stage-managed as to keep them palatable to the interests Teachers College seems anxious to serve. Three main impressions remain from the congress. The first was left by the bacallaureate platitudes that marked the principal speeches; there could be no quicker way to drain democracy of vitality than by celebrating it in an academic cave of the winds. The second was made by the ineptness of linking the democratic cause with hands-across-the-sea appeals by British Tories whose chief activity in the past few years has been the undermining of democracy. Baldwin held the reins of power when England connived in Japan's seizure of Manchuria, Mussolini's victory over Ethiopia, fascism's onslaught on Spain. Under Baldwin the pendulum of change in Britain began the swing back toward repression, with legislation against trade unions, the cooperatives, the unemployed, and—in the Sedition Act—free expression itself. Who is he to give us lessons in democracy?

Finally one must note the extent to which a Congress supposedly called in defense of democracy furnished a sounding-board for anti-democratic utterance and theory. Baldwin's explanation that fascism was the "aftermath of communism" in Germany and Italy could hardly have been bettered, in its blithe mendacity, by Coughlin. Lord Stamp attempted to whitewash the Portuguese and Greek dictatorships as "good" totalitarianisms. Butler explained that "democracy is not government by the mob. Democracy is not even government by a majority. . . ." Dean Russell warned that "complete economic equality" would be "fatal to democracy," and implied that ours was a "representative government" rather than a democracy. This dovetailed neatly into the theory put forward by H. W. Prentis, Jr., president of the Armstrong Cork Company and vice-president of the National Association of Manufacturers, in the most extraordinary speech of the congress. After warning that the future of the republic rests on "individual patriotism and religious faith," not in "more and more democracy," Prentis went on to expound the line now used by all American fascist groups, whether Nazi, Coughlinite, or Silver Shirt. Prentis declared the United States was never intended to be a de-

mocracy but a republic, pointed to the NLRB as an invidious example of democracy at work, lumped the "new liberalism" with communism, socialism, fascism, and Nazism, and ended by objecting—at this late date—to direct election of Senators. This last he declared "a serious blow . . . at our republican system" because with indirect election Senators "would not be so readily influenced by popular clamor." "Moreover," Prentis said, "the primary, the initiative, the referendum, the recall, and the delegation of sweeping powers to government commissions are all steps that have brought us closer and closer to the pitfalls of democracy." Prentis is a leading figure in the National Association of Manufacturers, which played a dominant role in the congress. Are his quasi-fascist ideas to be included in the books and leaflets which a permanent organization for "Education for Democracy" is planning to distribute in the schools? What did Prentis say in the closed seminar on "What Shall Be Done"? Other participants in that private discussion were Lamot du Pont, Felix M. McWhirter, Louis J. Taber. Du Pont interests are the biggest contributors to the National Association of Manufacturers and its widespread "educational" work, as the La Follette committee report discloses. McWhirter figured in the Dies committee revelations; he wrote a letter to John D. M. Hamilton, chairman of the Republican National Committee, introducing the anti-Semitic James E. Campbell as a "tried and trusted friend." The Dies committee also made public a letter from the fascist Deatherage to Campbell suggesting a meeting of leaders to plan for a Moseley dictatorship. Taber was one of those named in the letter as "on our side of the fence." Odd collaborators in education for democracy!

In *The Nation* of December 17 last James Wechsler, in an article entitled *Twilight at Teachers College*, reported that those in control of the college were moving toward "a discreet *Anschluss* with Wall Street." That *Anschluss* has now been effected. The idea of the congress may be traced back to Dean Russell's speech, "Divided We Fall," at the Congress of Industry held by the National Association of Manufacturers in New York last December. The report on the National Association of Manufacturers made last week by the La Follette committee shows that the N. A. M. has been as skilful as the old National Electric Light Association in poisoning the wells of public information. The report devotes a good deal of space to the N. A. M.'s "educational activities." The congress, particularly the Prentis speech, indicates what we may expect from this new movement for "education for democracy." It would mean the prostitution of education to the anti-democratic forces in America. To that prostitution Teachers College is offered up by its ambitious dean. Is the price to be the presidency of Columbia University when Nicholas Murray Butler dies or retires?

Finland Between Two Fires

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

BRITISH and Soviet diplomats, unable after months of negotiating to complete the defensive pact which the interests of both countries require, have now made way for the generals and admirals. In the political discussions the main obstacle to agreement seems to have been the question of guaranties to Finland and the Baltic states against indirect as well as direct aggression. The same problem must inevitably arise in the course of the staff talks, for clearly it would be futile to lay plans to meet a German attack on Poland or Rumania while ignoring the possibility of an offensive on the Baltic. If, then, the military men can agree on a course of action to meet this contingency, it may be easier to discover a formula to end the present diplomatic deadlock.

The starting-point for any realistic discussion of the problem is that Russia can no more afford to see its Baltic neighbors conquered or dominated by Germany than Britain can suffer a threat to the integrity of Holland or Belgium. Leningrad is the Achilles heel of the U. S. S. R.—its one great city not far removed from frontiers. The Finnish border lies a bare twenty miles away; that of Estonia under seventy. Access to the Baltic through the narrow Gulf of Finland is impeded by a number of small Finnish islands and could be blocked by a hostile power occupying the Aaland Islands to the north or the group belonging to Estonia to the south. Moreover, although the political and economic importance of Leningrad has been deliberately diminished by the Soviets, its strategic importance remains and has indeed been enhanced by the development of Murmansk and Kola on the Arctic coast. An enemy who succeeded in taking Leningrad would be favorably placed to cut the Murmansk Railway and the new ship canal and thus deprive Russia of communications with the west except through the Dardanelles and the Mediterranean.

Under these circumstances it is easy to appreciate Russia's insistence that any defensive pact with the Western powers must include safeguards against the use by an invader of the small states on its northeastern frontier. Nor can it be blamed for regarding with some skepticism the stout declarations by these countries of their willingness and ability to defend themselves against all onslaughts. It is no reflection on the courage of the Letts and Estonians to suggest that, unaided, they could do nothing to prevent a rapid German invasion. The combined population of Estonia and Latvia is little more than three millions, and they lack the financial and industrial resources for the equipment of a modern army.

Finland's position is, of course, somewhat stronger. It has a comparatively large and well-trained army, and the broken character of its coast line offers a considerable degree of natural protection against invasion by sea. Nevertheless, Finland, for reasons which will be developed later, if confronted by an ultimatum from Germany, might, no less than the other Baltic states, decide that discretion was the better part of valor.

Admitting the grounds for Russian suspicions, it is still possible to understand and sympathize with the dislike of the buffer states for inclusion in a system of guaranties. Standing as they do between two great powers both of which they have some reason to distrust, their one hope of safety seems to lie in absolute neutrality. Acceptance of Russian guaranties, whether or not counter-signed by Britain and France, on the one hand would expose them to German hostility and on the other, or so they fear, would surrender their independence to Moscow. "We understand very well," said Mr. Erkko, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a recent speech before the Finnish Diet, "what such an automatic guaranty, accorded without our consent or even consultation with us, would mean. It is incompatible with the autonomy and sovereignty of Finland. The only attitude we can adopt toward any state attempting to furnish so-called assistance, by virtue of a guaranty assumed on its own authority, when it considers that the state it pretends to protect has need of it, is to consider any such measure as an aggression." A similar line has been taken in Estonia. Early in June a leading newspaper in Tallin, *Paevaleht*, stated with the obvious approval of the government: "The Soviet Union forgets that the Baltic states oppose equally the National Socialist imperialism of Germany and the Communist imperialism of Russia. . . . The policy of the Soviet Union is to put Estonia, Latvia, and Finland in such a position that they would have to choose between becoming vassals or active defenders. Our choice is clear. There are no Hachas in Estonia. Estonia's choice is self-defense against both straightforward aggression and preventive aggression, even if the latter be termed assistance."

It may be difficult to take these fine sentiments absolutely at face value, but there is no need to assume that they conceal strong leanings toward Berlin. A recent visit to Finland has convinced me that public opinion there is far from pro-German. The Finns have old ties of friendship with Germany, but they have few illusions

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about the benevolence of the Nazi regime. For them, as for so many other peoples formerly inclined to German sympathies, the fate of the Czechs has proved an enlightening shock. The open acknowledgment of *Lebensraum* as the guiding principle of German policy has served as a reminder of ambitious German plans in 1918 to set up a group of Baltic dependencies—plans only thwarted by the collapse of the western front. Finland's independence, it is fully realized, would not be worth very much were Germany to establish an unchallenged supremacy in Europe.

Moreover, Finland values its free constitution as well as its independence. Democracy, if not so firmly established as in Sweden, has a real hold on the Finnish people. It conforms with their psychology and traditions, and their devotion to it was tested and strengthened by the long struggle against czarism. True, in recent times, faith has occasionally wavered. During the depression, which hit Finland early and hard, there was a period of two years when the country seemed heading straight for fascism. The Lapua movement, inspired originally by religious bigotry and the fears of a highly individualistic peasantry, became an instrument in the hands of big business, conducted a reign of terror against the left, and forced the government to suppress the Communist Party. But with this aim achieved it rapidly lost public support, and an attempt to stage a coup in 1932 collapsed ignominiously. With a revival in trade, democratic methods reasserted themselves. From the remnants of the Lapua movement a pseudo-fascist party known as the I. K. L. was formed, but it never succeeded in making much headway, and in the elections at the beginning of last month its parliamentary strength was reduced from fourteen to eight.

That Finland, after looking over the edge of the fascist abyss, should have had sufficient strength and steadiness to draw back, does it credit. But it must be recognized that in order to become so firmly established that it can resist a new crisis Finnish democracy needs a long period of peace and relative prosperity. That is one reason why the government will try desperately to remain neutral in the event of war, for whichever side it took there would be grave danger of the conflict turning to civil strife. The large Socialist element among the workers could hardly stomach alliance with the Nazis. On the other hand, any attempt to make common cause with Russia would meet with strong resistance from the peasants and the middle classes and give a new impetus to the I. K. L. Weak as this body is in voting power, it still infects some organs of the body politic, and in a condition of crisis its germs might spread rapidly. According to general report, it commands the allegiance of many of the younger army officers; it has a nucleus in the civil service and a strong following among the university students. It is also well entrenched among the Lutheran

clergy, who play an important role in the life of the rural districts and exercise considerable influence.

The fact must be faced that, however much the Finns as a whole fear and dislike the Nazis, an even more potent emotion is their hatred and distrust of Russia. This arises not merely from hostility to communism; its roots go back much farther than 1918, and it would

certainly survive any change of regime in Moscow. For it is bound up with memories of Russian invasion and repression; it is terror of the Great Bear, whose claws have always menaced its neighbors. How instinctive this hostility is can be illustrated by the story told about a leading Finnish general who, after a very convivial evening, insisted on ordering mobilization against Russia. His drunken conviction proved so catching that before more sober subordinates managed to get the orders countermanded he actually had some units marching toward the border. Such a pathological attitude is encouraged rather than cured by the increasing emphasis on nationalism in Russia, by the current attempts to array Stalin in the mantle of Peter the Great. That development may tend to reassure Western capitalists terrified of international communism, but for Russia's neighbors and one-time subjects it is cause for additional alarm.

To do Soviet Russia justice, it does not seem to have provided grounds for so much suspicion. For many years now it has had non-aggression pacts with its Baltic neighbors, and it has never made any move against their integrity. Nor is there any reason to suppose that it will do so in the future unless Germany attempts to use them as a base for hostile operations. Finns, when pressed to abandon historical emotionalism and list specific complaints against present-day Russia, usually concentrate on two points. They hold it responsible for the bloody civil war of 1918, officially known as the War for Independence. Actually that began as an internal conflict in which the "red" workers of the towns fought for an independent socialist republic, while their "white" opponents upheld the banner of capitalism and, after their victory, actually offered the crown of Finland to a German prince. The "reds" received some assistance from Russia, but the "whites" obtained not only weapons from Germany but the help of a considerable German army. Under the



Courtesy of the New York Times

circumstances it is hardly possible to regard this war as an attempt to retain Finland under the domination of the Soviets.

The other grievance is Russia's alleged failure to carry out all the provisions of the Treaty of Dorpat, by which in 1920 the frontier between the two countries was defined. Its terms gave Finland access to the Arctic but compelled it to relinquish its claim to Eastern Karelia, a province inhabited by people closely akin to the Finns. Russia promised that this district would have the fullest internal autonomy—a promise which, the Finns allege, has never been carried out. The rights and wrongs of this dispute are not very well defined. In 1921 a rising against the Soviets in Eastern Karelia, apparently inspired by Finnish irredentist propaganda, was severely repressed. Thereafter the Communist Party took over control of the province, which eventually was constituted the East Karelian Socialist Soviet Republic, enjoying the same degree of "autonomy" as other minor units of the Soviet Union.

This is one reason why, ever since the war, the relations between Finland and Russia have been at best correct, never friendly. The most serious consequence is that commercial relations between the two countries are practically non-existent. When Finland was part of the Russian Empire, it found the main market for its products there, but as an independent state it has turned its back on the East and endeavored to build up commercial relations with the West. This policy has proved very successful but has led to an undue dependence on the British market, which buys over 50 per cent of Finnish exports. In the event of war, this trade would almost certainly be stopped, and the only well-established customer within reach would be Germany. Thus the latter would acquire an economic hold on Finland by means of which it would almost certainly attempt to gain political and strategic concessions.

What kind of demands might be expected? The most obvious perhaps would be occupation of the Aaland Islands, which lie near the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia, a little to the north of the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. Strategically they would have a threefold value for Germany. They are within a short flight of Stockholm and could thus be used as an air base to enforce Swedish obedience; they command the narrow channel through which must pass the ships bringing iron ore from the north of Sweden to Germany; they would make a most convenient submarine base for operations designed to bottle up the Russian Baltic fleet. By a convention signed in 1921 under the auspices of the League of Nations these islands are unfortified, but Finland, with the strong support of Sweden, is now anxious to have this restriction annulled. The signatories to the convention, including Germany, have consented, but the sanction of the League is also required, and this so far has been blocked

by Russia. The latter's objections are easily explained. It is unconvinced by Finland's declarations that it wants to be in a position to defend the islands against all comers and suspects that in case of a demand from Germany backed by threats the Finns would be neither able nor willing to resist. The benefits of the fortifications would then accrue to Germany and make it extremely difficult to dislodge its forces there.

Understandable as the Russian attitude is, it neglects one important factor. In addition to the negative pressures exerted by Moscow and Berlin there is a third force helping to shape Finnish foreign policy—the pull of the Scandinavian countries. Finland is now a member of the northern neutral bloc of democratic states, which are in close and constant consultation. Its relations with Sweden—strained for many years because of these same Aaland Islands, which ethnographically are wholly Swedish—are now extremely close. If in the event of attempted aggression it chose to call for Swedish aid, it would certainly obtain the maximum assistance, for Sweden is vitally concerned in preventing the occupation of the Aalands by any belligerent power. Hence for Finland to yield this position without defending it to the last would be an act of the blackest treachery against a close friend. Herein lies a real safeguard for Russia, provided that Russia itself has no designs on the islands so long as they are neutral territory.

Of course it is clear that Finland and Sweden combined could not for long sustain an attack by the full force of Germany. But the kind of aggression under discussion would be only likely to occur as the consequence of a general war, and Germany would be unable to detach for such an operation more than a limited force. The Finnish army is not to be despised, and Sweden is rapidly building up an effective military machine. Thus with the natural geographical advantages of their position the two countries could put up a very determined defense.

Refortification of the Aalands has not yet begun and is, in fact, in suspense, although Finnish authorities declare they are prepared to go ahead irrespective of Russian opposition. But the essential agreement between Finland and Sweden has not yet been ratified by the latter, which seems reluctant to take this step until Russian sanction is secured. Moreover, Britain, when requested to approve the revision of the 1920 convention, replied that it had no objection in principle and would raise none on the understanding that other parties to the convention and *also the Soviet government* were consulted. In the event of a British alliance with Russia being consummated it is likely that Finland will be reminded that Britain's approval of its Aaland plans was conditioned in this manner.

In any case, the conclusion of a firm Anglo-Russian-French pact, underwriting Soviet security in the Baltic

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region, would introduce new factors into the situation. By showing that the anti-aggressive front means business such a pact would encourage the small would-be neutral states to resist intimidation by Germany. It might then be worth Russia's while to make a friendly gesture to Finland and give its consent to the Aaland fortifications

without further haggling. Such a step would perhaps involve gambling on the maintenance of a democratic regime in Finland. But the alternative policy carries a risk of driving the Finns into German arms and thereby compromising the position of Sweden and Norway, about whose anti-fascist sympathies there can be no doubt.

Radio Censors Itself

BY DOROTHY ROCKWELL

Radio . . . may not be used to convey attacks upon another's race or religion. . . . News broadcasts shall not be editorial. News shall not be selected with the purpose of furthering or hindering either side of any controversial public issue, nor shall it be colored by the opinions or desires of the station or network management, the editor or others engaged in its preparation, the person actually delivering it over the air, or, in the case of sponsored news broadcasts, the advertiser. News commentators as well as all other newscasters shall be governed by this provision. . . . Should time be sold for the discussion of controversial public issues and for the propagation of the views of individuals or groups, a powerful public forum would inevitably gravitate almost wholly into the hands of those with the greater means to buy it. . . .

THESE are passages from the self-regulatory code ratified in mid-July by a majority of the station owners and managers in the United States, at the suggestion and under the auspices of the National Association of Broadcasters (N. A. B.). Commenting on this move, the industry's trade magazine, *Broadcasting*, said: "From where we sit, it's not solely a question of self-regulation. It amounts to self-sacrifice. But if it keeps the FCC on its technical-regulatory beat, and prevents it from barging into program matters with a censorship warrant from Congress, it will be worth the price." And in the *New York World-Telegram* of July 15, General Hugh S. Johnson, a radio commentator himself, let fly with two columns on the theme: "The new code for radio broadcasting treads dangerous ground. . . . Censorship is censorship. . . ."

These two opinions are representative of press reaction throughout the country. The broadcasters' attitude is shown by the fact that N. A. B. members ratified the code, after three days of discussion and with very few changes, by approximately six to one. They ratified it because, though it embodies grave threats to station and network income (stringent clauses about undesirable children's programs and the length of commercial copy are included), it amounts to no more than a gesture.

The membership of the National Association of Broad-

casters consists of about 400 radio stations, virtually all the network members. More than 700 stations are operating under FCC licenses in the United States at the present time. Last year, according to FCC statistics, 240 of those 700-odd stations lost an average of \$10,000 apiece. The financially unstable third of the radio industry cannot afford N. A. B. dues, and is therefore unaffected by the code. These stations, of course, will broadcast anything that will bring them revenue. No better example of the ineffectiveness of the new code could be found than the Coughlin broadcasts, which, says the N. A. B. hopefully, and off the record, are likely to become the first big test case.

Last year, through Aircasters, Inc., a small Detroit advertising agency, Father Coughlin spent an estimated \$20,000 a week broadcasting over a special network of some forty-five stations. Long before the N. A. B. code was adopted, the established networks had found ways to avoid carrying him; so Coughlin hired his own land lines from the A. T. and T. for an hour a week, running them from small station to small station and picking those outlets whose coverage area included the largest cities.* On a Sunday toward the end of the year he uttered a violently partisan denunciation of communism which was plainly anti-Semitic. This represented a change in tone which three station managers found intolerable. They asked Coughlin thereafter to submit his scripts in advance and to make the changes thought necessary by their program departments—in other words, to submit to their censorship. He refused, and they broke their contracts with Aircasters, Inc. The affront to Coughlin became a *cause célèbre* overnight. In Manhattan, WMCA has been picketed every Sunday since the middle of last December, and its advertisers threatened with boycott, by a noisy and persistent group of Coughlinites masquerading behind the title of "Committee for the Defense of Americans' Constitutional Rights." WDAS in Philadelphia has had somewhat similar treatment.

* A Gallup poll conducted in December, 1938, showed him to have a listening audience of 3,500,000 regularly, with about 15,000,000 who have heard him at least once, almost entirely from metropolitan districts.

The N. A. B. code would officially bar Coughlin from the air on two counts: if he buys time, he must comply with the ruling about "attacks upon another's race or religion"; if he says he speaks not as a priest but as a crusader, he cannot buy time on code stations. If time is assigned to him, time will also be assigned to anyone who wishes to answer him. But those 240 stations that lost money last year are not members of N. A. B. If Coughlin can pay the price, neither the code nor the 1934 Communications Act restrains him from using a special network of 240 stations, which would be the largest network in the country. Advertisers of any kind can do the same. They can buy time for any product they want to sell provided they comply with the regulations of the Federal Trade Commission or escape the commission's notice altogether. Furthermore, the only penalty attached to infringement of the code by N. A. B. members is expulsion from the association.

The Federal Communications Commission is a seven-man body headed by Frank R. McNinch, former chief of the Federal Power Commission, whose resignation takes effect September 1. At the moment, the commission is torn by internal dissensions and in general fear of its life. Congressional bills on the subject have come and gone, and the President himself suggested that it be cut to a three-man board. For the past eight months it has been putting the broadcasters through their catechism in an investigation of network monopoly. The industry has been scurrying to Washington to give the figures on its investment, equipment value, profit and loss, but neither these nor the questions asked by William J. Dempsey, attorney for the FCC and one of Tom Corcoran's men, have brought to light much that is new. Broadcasters and trade reporters are of the opinion that McNinch called the investigation simply to forestall a Congressional investigation of the FCC. They maintain that Roosevelt appointed him two years ago to "clean up radio," but he has done no more than reorganize the commission departmentally.

According to the vague but powerful Communications Act, the FCC is a licensing body primarily, with technical regulatory powers. It licenses stations for a period which has just been extended from six months to a year, and decides what power and coverage stations may have. Its function is indicated by one vague clause: the stations and networks must operate "in the public interest, convenience, and necessity." The phrase has never been formally interpreted—for various reasons. An interpretation handed down gratis by the commission would seem to imply censorship. Thus the FCC has been strictly noncommittal about Father Coughlin and the many pressure groups which have wanted radio time. Also, the members of the FCC find it impossible to agree on the point, Commissioner T. A. M. Craven's views being

almost always opposed to those of his colleagues.

Until recently the FCC has paid little attention to international broadcasting other than to license short-wave stations under the "public interest" clause. Two months ago, however, it handed down a new set of rules containing this statement: "A licensee of an international broadcasting station shall render only such an international broadcast service which will reflect the culture of this country and which will promote international good-will, understanding, and cooperation." It also announced that broadcasters could sell their international programs to advertisers, a direct reversal of its former policy on short-wave broadcasts. This new ruling was interpreted rightly by the networks and companies owning short-wave stations to mean censorship of foreign broadcasts, an interpretation which was reinforced by the threat contained in bills introduced by Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico and Representative Emanuel Celler of New York to erect a government station in or near Washington for the ostensible purpose of covering South America. In the middle of July the ruling was temporarily suspended in response to loud protests by the N. A. B. and the American Civil Liberties Union.

More than a dozen short-wave stations are now operating in this country, broadcasting on an average sixteen hours a day. The best service is apparently rendered by N. B. C., whose two stations, W3XL and W3XAL, cover Europe by day and Latin America at night, broadcasting in Italian, German, French, and English to Europe, and in Spanish and Portuguese to South America. One-quarter of the program is assigned to "cultural" events, one-quarter to news straight off the A. P., U. P., and I. N. S. tickers, and one-half to music.

United States transmitters send more material to Latin America than do all the foreign powers combined. And their service is received eagerly and with belief even by citizens of the totalitarian states. "Because I was obliged to go to a meeting against the Jews on Friday," wrote a short-wave fan from Munich, "I could not listen to your broadcast, but a friend heard your call and advised me." Another message, from Vienna, read: "In contrast to other stations your news is objective, though too short for our needs. For reasons which are obvious to you I cannot express myself further." From Bratislava: "I have seldom heard so much about the fate of the Jews as in your broadcasts . . . the quotations from American newspapers are exceedingly interesting, because we never hear such many words about humanity here." From Khartoum, Egypt, came a letter in German: "It is a great satisfaction to be able to hear unbiased news in German—instead of the unbearable reports full of deliberate lies that are broadcast by the German short-wave stations." N. B. C. received about 50,000 letters in the same vein last year. Occasionally one of the stations gets a complaint, such as this one from Guatemala: ". . . dis-

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gusting and repulsive. You might introduce a pro-Judah hour." The annual cost to each United States short-wave station has been estimated at \$500,000, with no revenue from advertising.

The broadcasting industry is not unreasonably suspicious of the purposes of a government-owned station. It is not forgotten that there are only about 2,500,000 receivers in all Latin America, roughly a third of them equipped for short-wave reception, while at the same time there are 27,000,000 radio sets in the United States, at least half of which have short-wave equipment. Transmitters, moreover, can pick up a short-wave message and rebroadcast it long-wave, as was done for some broadcasts at the time of the Munich pact, thus making it possible for all those 27,000,000 radio sets to be reached at one time by a government speaker using the short-wave station ostensibly intended for a foreign audience. The industry can also make the point that with the government operating its own station and the FCC, answerable to the White House, dealing out licenses, nothing would be simpler than for the Department of Education to jam anything it wanted down the broadcasters' throats.

The N. A. B. self-regulatory code means that the 400 strongest stations have so arranged matters that on the one hand the FCC can't complain that the industry is unable to police itself, and on the other the government,

like everyone else, must find a way to hurdle these rules if it wants more than its allotted time or to ban its opponents from the air. If the code has little punitive power behind it, the FCC, under the Communications Act, has no power to rescind a word of it. The code represents what the radio industry thinks the Communications Act means by "public interest, convenience, and necessity."

As for the opinion of General Johnson, "The new code for radio broadcasting treads dangerous ground. . . . Censorship is censorship," the General is right of course: censorship is censorship, no matter who applies it. There are different kinds of censorship, however, and the question is, which kind do the American people want? The N. A. B. code embodies a self-policing ideal, dictated by a desire for safety before all else, and cannot be enforced. Its principle is to let everyone have a limited say, to keep poison and antidote on hand, to hogtie the pressure groups, and to keep radio primarily an entertainment medium. The government, on the other hand, sees in radio the greatest medium of mass appeal ever known. While there is still peace in the world, the N. A. B. code will probably forestall definite government action, but the machinery for clamping down is ready and waiting. Right now the industry has the FCC under its thumb, but once the guns go off, the commission will take over.

The British Conscience

BY REINHOLD NIEBUHR

London, August 10

A STAY of nearly five months in Britain, beginning with the week when Hitler's entry into Prague shocked the amazed and incredulous Britishers into a complete reversal of their foreign policy, leaves the visitor baffled by certain aspects of the nation's new policy. The people are firmly resolved to resist further aggression. Of that there can be no doubt. Week by week the determination becomes more obvious. Hundreds of thousands of civilians have enlisted for various forms of civilian war-time service. Peace-time conscription, which violated a British tradition of centuries, has been accepted quite cheerfully, after an initial flurry of opposition from Liberals and Labor. (Labor, incidentally, revealed its essentially liberalistic outlook by opposing conscription in the name of liberty. There was a time when it seemed politically precarious to introduce conscription; and Labor might have gained valuable concessions in the form of a Russian pact and a democratization of the army as the price of its support for the measure. Pure opposition was bound to fail. The logic

of the Polish and Rumanian commitments pointed irrefutably to such a step.) The determination of the nation to resist further Nazi adventures can only be defined as "grim." An overwhelming majority of the people desire the Russian pact, being quite well aware that the new "encirclement" policy is risky without it.

What is puzzling to a foreign observer is that the Prime Minister whose foreign policy has been completely reversed is still in office, that the Russian pact is not yet signed, that the campaign of the *Manchester Guardian* and the *London Daily Telegraph* for the inclusion of Winston Churchill in the Cabinet has not succeeded. These things are the more surprising because it is generally felt that the Nazis are not convinced that the British mean business this time. The suspicion is freely voiced that the Nazis are not impressed because they still rely not only on tentative public gestures of appeasement but also on sub rosa approaches of a less tentative character which give them the assurance that Britain will not fight for Danzig.

Since the whole danger of war lies in the possibility

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that the mistakes of 1914 may be made over again—that the Germans may be led astray by a semblance of irresolution on the surface of British foreign policy and remain unaware of the firm resolution underneath—it seems strange that Britain does not make more desperate efforts to resolve the confusion. Most persons agree that Hitler does not want and could not afford a general war. It is probably true that an increasing number of Nazis have made themselves believe that though they could not win a long war they might win a *Blitzkrieg*, a lightning war, in which victory would be obtained by devastating air attacks on London and Paris. Such delusions might conceivably betray Hitler's crowd into a mad venture even if the resolution of England were made completely clear. Yet on the whole it is still true that the Nazis are gambling on the possibility of neutralizing Britain. That is where the danger of war lies.

In view of the grim resolution of the country one asks why the steps taken to dispel these illusions are not more vigorous. A change in the government would serve the purpose overnight. Those who see politics in purely economic terms will argue that the class interests of the oligarchy which controls Britain are still operative. They fear a pact with Russia almost as much as the Polish landlords do, and they still have a strong sense of affinity with Hitler. This may be true. But it is also true that a very powerful group in the Conservative Party, including such influential figures as the Marquis of Salisbury and Lord Camrose, the owner of the *Daily Telegraph*, want the Russian pact signed and Churchill included in the Cabinet. Why cannot general public opinion in league with powerful Tories defeat a group of Tories which stands virtually alone?

I do not claim to have an answer, but I suspect that there is an aspect of British character which partly explains the situation. The equivocations of Chamberlain's government are opposed but not resented as deeply as the facts might warrant because they correspond to certain moral scruples in the British character, scruples which Chamberlain probably does not share but which his policy satisfies. The British are a profoundly moral people. Continental and American cynics may jeer at this moral sensitivity and point to Ireland and India. They may say that pure moralists do not build an empire. It is perfectly true of course that imperialists cannot be pure moralists. Politics is a contest of power, and that fact cannot be completely obscured from those who practice the craft. But politics is not purely a contest of power. The mistake of the Germans is to imagine that it is, and therefore to neglect the important imponderables of the political game. The British have been able to combine politics and ethics and to play the game of politics with a comparatively good conscience because they are also traditionalists. Britain is the only modern

nation in which feudal traditionalism and modern rationalism have been combined in a living unity. Traditionalism checks and partially obscures the brutalities of political conflict. It does not ask whether certain social relations are right or just in the abstract, but how they are justified in terms of past practices and traditions.

The weakness of such a traditionalism is that it maintains ancient and outworn institutions and relationships beyond their day. The class structure in Britain, for instance, is feudal rather than bourgeois-capitalist as in France and America. The strength of traditionalism is that it places an initial check upon the brutalities of politics which makes it possible for the moralist to operate in the sphere of politics without turning into a cynic or gagging at the brutal realities. It also establishes certain securities about which the various contestants in the political battle can be so certain that the social struggle is slightly mitigated. One need only read the political philosophy of Edmund Burke, the most typical of all British social philosophers, to understand what this traditionalism means in British life. Whether its importance is fully understood or not, the fruits of this combination of traditionalism and moralism are quite apparent. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, and the Labor leader George Lansbury are both good examples of this quality of British public life. Halifax is just as much an anomaly in the chancelleries of Europe as Lansbury in a Continental Socialist convention. In no other nation are men of such sensitive conscience active in politics.

Of course there are certain limits to the insights of traditionalist moralists. They see politics so much in terms of a traditional equilibrium of power, which moral good-will can perfect, that they are betrayed into both political and ethical miscalculations. In politics they easily forget that every equilibrium of power is a tension of power, that every tension of power is a potential conflict of power, and that every potential conflict must on occasion become overt. As moralists they forget that no scheme of justice based upon a given equilibrium of social forces can completely transcend the given equilibrium. As traditionalists they do not see the reality of social conflict, and as moralists they do not see its occasional desirability and necessity. This lack of vision is what gives force to the frequent charge of "hypocrisy" leveled at British statesmanship. Probably even the most critical observer will admit, however, that the hypocrisy of British statesmanship belongs in a different category from Hitler's claim to be the "protector" of Bohemia.

The present difficulty of the British conscience is not derived from the inevitable hypocrisy of the moralist engaged in politics. On the contrary, it is caused by too active a conscience, which does not know what to do with itself. The British have a profoundly uneasy conscience about Versailles. When the German army entered

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the Rhineland, the French importuned the British in vain for help. The doom of France was really sealed in that moment. The British government may have withheld help for its own reasons. But the British people found the abstention right because they felt it to be "just." In the same way Munich was possible because the man in the street felt it to be just that the Sudeten Germans should be incorporated into the Reich. The British people are a collective Hamlet, and conscience has made cowards of them all.

Furthermore, the average Britisher is much too moral to understand the nihilistic mania which informs Nazi politics. He does not understand that considerations of international justice are used by Hitler only to further grandiose ambitions which have nothing to do with the injustices of Versailles. Even today the British press daily publishes letters from readers that are pathetic in their plea to Hitler to please understand that the charge of "encirclement" is not justified and that Britain will come to terms with him if he will only stop his threats. Tentative gestures of appeasement, in short, satisfy a subconscious moral uneasiness below the level of conscious resolution to resist.

I do not wish to make the cynical suggestion that politics is above or below moral considerations. On the contrary, I believe that the Germans are about to prove that pure *Machtpolitik* reduces itself to an absurdity. But there are subordinate technical political considerations which the moralist easily forgets. Until men become discarnate spirits, their corporate life achieves justice only through tensions of power. A world which is not good enough to keep the promise to disarm made at Versailles ought to be wise enough not to allow Germany to arm and attempt a unilateral revision of treaties. A world not good enough to prevent a "captive" nation from becoming mad in its captivity ought to be wise enough to take proper precautions against maniacal fury. If we deal with politics at all, we ought to know that the question of Czechoslovakia was a strategic question and not merely one of the justice of keeping three million Germans separated from their fatherland.

If war breaks out in Europe, it will be a contest between *Realpolitiker* who have no moral scruples and political moralists who had too many scruples, or at least had them at inconvenient moments. It is not an easy thing to know just when and where to make moral scruples effective in politics. But in the event of war the moralists will discover once more that there is no place in the sequence of events where responsible agents in the political struggle can be free of guilt. American moralists, incidentally, will discover that an isolation which may have contributed to make the conflict inevitable is hardly a vantage point of guiltlessness. But the horrors of war will be a high price to pay for that lesson.

FOR MONTHS the State Department tried without success to induce the Franco government to allow Sosthenes Behn, president of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company, to enter Spain and inspect his company's extensive properties in that country. On August 8 the Federal Export-Import Bank extended a \$13,750,000 cotton credit to Franco; within a week Mr. Behn received his visa.

FROM THE MIDDLE WEST comes the story, said to be true, of the union organizer who, when asked what his political connections were, replied that he was a Trotskyist. When the questioning worker demanded a fuller explanation, the Trotskyist started to expound the program of his group, whereupon the worker cut him short by remarking: "Oh, sure, I know now; you're one of them fellows the Communists call 'reds.'"

THE BRITISH *Time and Tide* reports "enormous resentment" among Reichswehr officers at the government's treatment of the widow of General Hoffmann, Germany's only unbeaten World War commander. As a Jewess, Frau Hoffmann has been deprived of her pension and subjected to the usual humiliations inflicted on the Jews of the Reich. In desperation the aged widow sent an appeal to Hitler "to stop discrimination and humiliation which I cannot survive and which would reflect on one of the most illustrious representatives of the old army." From one of Hitler's secretaries came the reply: "The Führer cannot see his way to consider the appeal."

ONE FOR THE NLRB: Forty employees of the La Porte Foundry Company of La Porte, Indiana, recently formed a new union while a strike was in progress and returned to work. The would-be strike-breakers call their organization the Federal Wagner Act Union.

FROM HEDDA HOPPER'S column in the *Chicago Daily News* comes this restrained comment on the Bridges hearing: "I'm a peace-loving woman, but even so I'm sick of seeing Harry Bridges's face on every front page. So why not give him over to the Legion and police he so despises? And let them try gentleness, but give us a rest. Wouldn't you rather see a bathing beauty?"

THE TREASURY BUILDING in Washington, with its massive gray-stone walls and grilled windows, is a somber and forbidding structure. The walls of the pressroom in the basement, however, are lined with a glamorous collection of photographs of nudes. A few weeks ago a prize item of the collection disappeared, whereupon the gentlemen of the press called in the Secret Service. The operatives were warned that if they failed to locate the missing nude within a specified time, their deadly rivals, the G-men, would be called in to supplant them.

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

Issues and Men

BY OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

WITH those of my friends who feel that Mr. Roosevelt is right in asserting that the Congress of the United States may profoundly have altered the European situation and invited war in Europe by its refusal to pass precisely the kind of neutrality legislation that the President asked, I should like to reason quietly and soberly. I cannot accept this opinion for the reason that it seems to me unrealistic and not in accordance with the facts of the European situation. It reminds me too much of the kind of criticism that those who opposed our warring in the Philippines and against Germany were subjected to in 1899 and in 1914-17. We were always being told on the former occasion that if anybody questioned the wisdom of McKinley's policies it would hearten the Filipinos fighting for their liberty. During the early World War days we were assured that everything we did profoundly influenced Berlin. As a matter of fact, mighty few Filipinos knew what was happening in the United States or had ever heard of the anti-imperialists; yet they continued to fight on. We know now that the reason the Germans took the final plunge in 1917 and came out for unlimited submarine warfare was not the existence of divergent views in the United States but the conviction of the army and navy leaders that they could bring England to terms through the submarine, whether we came in or stayed out.

Undoubtedly Hitler and Ribbentrop know what is happening in the United States, but the idea that the inability of Congress to see eye to eye with Franklin Roosevelt in regard to the neutrality of this country will decide Hitler to risk his own downfall and the collapse of the Third Reich on the gamble of war seems to me just a little queer. At most, this could be only one small factor among the many which will influence him when he finally makes up his mind whether it is to be war or peace. Can anyone deny that far more important than any American action is the attitude of his axis partner—whether, for example, Italy is willing to risk everything in order that the Germans shall get Danzig again? Hitler knows full well what happens to a dictator beaten in war and what was the fate of a stupid, weak, and incompetent Kaiser. He is not going to invite a similar disaster without weighing more important considerations than whether or not the Allies will be able to buy munitions in the United States. I am inclined to regard as far more vital the military questions of whether the German army is really ready and whether the Siegfried Line is completed

and strong enough to hold off the vastly superior French army.

But let us look at the problem from another angle, that of the *Blitzkrieg*. Hitler knows that he cannot win a long-drawn-out war, especially with the Yugoslavs and the Rumanians on his flank and the Czechs eager to profit by any war. But if he can win a lightning war, if his air force can strike such a blow at France and England, as Göring believes it can, that those two countries will have to sue for peace or face the complete destruction of their capitals and leading cities and the death of hundreds of thousands of their women and children, certainly no American supplies can reach England or France in time to be of aid. For it is not a question of sending our own air armadas over. The friends with whom I am disagreeing do not come right out and say that they want us to go to war on the side of the Allies. Thus far they have limited themselves to declaring that the Allies should have the right freely to buy military supplies, airplanes, and so on after war begins.

Well, if the war lasts only a few weeks or months, there will be precious few cargoes of supplies landed in England or France from America during that time. Surely, President Roosevelt's demand of Congress for 500 airplanes, to be rushed to completion with the greatest possible speed, had nothing whatever to do with the defense of the United States. We have far more airplanes now than we need to take care of our country; that is the testimony of numerous experts, of whom only one need be cited. Admiral Leahy has stated that no bomber in the world could fly 750 miles and return with a war-time load. No, the purpose of building those 500 planes is merely to have them on hand to sell, lend, or lease to the Allies if they get into war. Since they will not be ready in months, they will certainly not figure in any lightning war that starts this fall. Therefore the whole attitude of the upholders of Mr. Roosevelt is entirely unrealistic, without thoughtful consideration of the factors which will really decide Hitler whether or not to fight.

If he takes the plunge, it will surely be because he has maneuvered himself into a position where nothing else is possible. He will be driven into it by the demands of his prestige, by the necessity of living up to his threats to Poland and other countries. He will be driven into it by the Reich's parlous economic condition, by his inability to keep up his armaments indefinitely, not by any act of our Congress.

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BOOKS and the ARTS

Bitter Fruit of the Tree

BY STERLING BROWN

They said to my grandmother: "Please do not be bitter,"
When they sold her first-born and let the second die,
When they drove her husband till he took to the swamp-lands,

And brought him home bloody and beaten at last.
They told her, "It is better you should not be bitter,
Some must work and suffer so that we, who must, can live,

Forgiving is noble, you must not be heathen bitter;
These are your orders: you are *not* to be bitter."
And they left her shack for their porticoed house.

They said to my father: "Please do not be bitter,"
When he plowed and planted a crop not his,
When he weatherstripped a house that he could not enter,

And stored away a harvest he could not enjoy.
They answered his questions: "It does not concern you,
It is not for you to know, it is past your understanding,
All you need to know is: you must not be bitter."
And they laughed on their way to reckon the crop.
And my father walked over the garnered acres
Where a cutting wind warned him of the cold to come.

They said to my brother: "Please do not be bitter,
Is it not sad to see the old place go to ruin?
The eaves are sprung and the chimney tower is leaning,
The sills, joists, and columns are rotten in the core;
The blinds hang crazy and the shingles blow away,
The fields have gone back to broomsedge and pine,
And the soil washes down the red gully scars.
With so much to be done, there's no time for being bitter.

Your father made it for us, it is up to you to save it,
What is past is over, and you must not be bitter."
But my brother is bitter, and he does not hear.

Men at Work

CHRIST IN CONCRETE. By Pietro di Donato. The Bobbs-Merrill Company. \$2.50.

EXPANDED from the short story of the same alliterative title which appeared in *Esquire* last year, "Christ in Concrete" has become a powerful novel, a symphony of suffering interspersed with pungent, earthy *scherzi*. The original story, which ended with the collapse of a construction job and the burial of its foreman in a flood of molten concrete, forms

the first chapter of the book; the remainder pictures the youthful Odyssey of Geremio's son Paul, who, twelve years old at the time of his father's death, undertakes to support his mother and seven brothers and sisters by bricklaying.

The characters who vividly people the story are drawn from poverty-ridden New York construction workers and their families, transplanted Italians whom Pietro di Donato knows from his fourteen years as a bricklayer; and with his remarkable sense for words he has caught and crystallized their effervescent, volubly poetic speech with its imagery piquantly compounded of the soil, their work, and their theology. His own terse style, made telegraphic by personification and frequent omission of the article, throbs with reality, with the feel of brick and mortar, the smells of labor, the tang of sour wine and olive oil and red peppers. Only a man whose muscles and stomach have felt the fatigue and the hunger of hard manual labor can paint them with such blunt, convincing strokes.

One of the refreshing things about the book is the fact that most of its action takes place during the twenties, the boom period, and even in the brief final chapter which enters the depression Paul still manages to find work, though he has to "kick back" part of his salary to the foreman. The author has achieved his effect splendidly without recourse to the all too recurrent depression-unemployment-idleness-despair theme. One is apt to realize with a good deal of surprise, after finishing the book, that there has been no trace of propaganda for or against any economic ideology, not even a mention of an ism. The work itself of these poor, ignorant laborers brings its plenty of horror and tragedy; enforced idleness or mendicancy or WPA would seem almost a vacation. And it is that work that the author has successfully dramatized: its appearance, its feel, its dangers, its effect on the character of the worker, all that he has compellingly personified as Job.

LOUIS B. SALOMON

The Fall of Prague

LOST LIBERTY? By Joan and Jonathan Griffin. Oxford University Press. \$2.50.

IT IS not even a year since the great betrayal of Czechoslovakia was successfully engineered, but reports already written about it would make a good-sized library. I read a great many of them, and I am always rather surprised to open a new account of events which I think I know pretty thoroughly and to find not only new facts and documents but also a fresh presentation of the great tragedy which began with the dispatch of Runciman to Prague and did not end with Hitler's occupation of the last democracy in Central Europe on the Ides of March this year.

The present book is one of those too few minutely documented reports that make exciting reading. The authors, an English couple, both journalists with convictions, who had

lived in Czechoslovakia before, returned to observe last year's "crisis," which they thought would lead either to Hitler's giving up his claims or to a general war in which he would be defeated. But there was a third possibility which became reality: Hitler got what he wanted, and much more, without war. The Griffins are first-class reporters. Move by move they trace the intrigues by which the seemingly impossible was accomplished. Equipped with an exact knowledge of the country, its people, and its leaders, and with an admirable ability to see the trees and the forest at the same time, they make one relive, on the spot and day by day, one of the most profound and instructive dramas of modern history. They never write fiction, never oversimplify, yet the heart beats as theirs did. They quote widely from diplomatic documents which are here published, in an appendix, for the first time in full, and their technique of heightening the suspense and at the same time clarifying the issues by means of quotations is superb. Many burning questions are reasonably answered, especially the decisive one which the world still asks: Why did the great democracies give in to Hitler, delivering up to him the best and ablest friend they had? The authors' answer is the truism, still so little understood, that the capitalistic fear of communism was at the bottom of the betrayal; and they conclude: "If freedom is to come out of this struggle, the would-be democracies must prove themselves real democracies"—the struggle being that between "militarist dictatorship and respect for human individuality."

Highly as I must praise the job which the Griffins did as reporters, I can only regret the vagueness of their social philosophy. Not that I would disagree with their basic observation that the "democracies" must become "real" democracies or the fascists will be victorious. But the question is *how* to make England and France real democracies, how to free them from the Cliveden set and the two hundred families? To this no answer is given, and therefore a phrase like "must prove themselves real democracies" is only a pious and meaningless wish. It's high time that such excellent people as the Griffins drew concrete conclusions from their observations.

FRANZ HOELLERING

"A Solemn Wilderness"

ALL THE BRAVE. Drawings by Luis Quintinilla. Prefaces by Ernest Hemingway and Jay Allen. Explanatory Text by Elliot Paul. Modern Age Books. 95 cents.

"A SOLEMN wilderness where all the brave lie dead"—this line from a sonnet by William Wordsworth might have been written yesterday with reference to the present tragedy in Spain; its place at the beginning of a volume of reproductions of Luis Quintinilla's drawings of the Spanish War is startlingly relevant. Last spring an exhibition of these drawings at the New York Museum of Modern Art was one of the major artistic events of the year. Now, with the curtain fallen on the final disaster, the appearance of these reproductions is bound to evoke wide interest.

For years Quintinilla was dreaded by monarchists and reactionaries for the bitter satire of his etchings. At the outbreak of the revolt in 1936 he was engaged upon a series of mural decorations for University City in Madrid and for the monu-

ment to Pablo Iglesias; these were utterly destroyed by airplane bombs during the siege of the city. For the first year and a half of the struggle Quintinilla was too busy fighting in the Guadarrama Mountains and in the Madrid trenches to brood upon the destruction of his greatest work, on which he had spent five years. Yet even at that time, as Hemingway recounts, he was never without pencil and paper. Finally, the government ordered him from the front and commissioned him to make a series of war drawings.

The collection shown in New York last year was the result. Many, particularly those from Teruel, were done while the artist was actually under fire. All were executed under circumstances that made the medium of etching impossible, yet the drawings approximate to an extraordinary degree the effects obtained with the burin and the zinc plate. There is little obvious propaganda in Quintinilla's work: no sadistic delight in scenes of massacre or rape, such as one sometimes sees in Goya, no macabre atrocities. For Quintinilla enemy and friend alike are helpless human beings caught in a net of tragic disaster. Dead Moors fester in the sunlight. Wounded animals crawl into caves beside their masters to be safe from the hurtling bombs. Peasants caught unawares at their work in the fields look up puzzled at the low diving planes or fall under a spray of bullets. Cowed by suffering and starvation, gaunt Guardia Civiles give themselves up, while the wife of one, holding a dead baby in her arms, jibbers at the victors. The drawings from the prison camps have a grim humor. Varying racial types are deftly limned. German prisoners stride past, almost at a goose-step. A lean Italian pours spaghetti down his throat. His companion warbles *Sola Mia*. Quintinilla draws them, not with hate but with almost tender sympathy.

Hemingway's introduction is, as he says himself, "churlish." He was angry at the war, angry, too, for some undisclosed reason, at Quintinilla, when editors began cabling him for a long-promised "introduction" with the threat of breaking the publication contract. So Hemingway rapped out the specified number of words. "A letter at a time, a word at a time, a page at a time, it comes out as well as any toothpaste squeezes and probably reads as attractively as the vilest toothpastes taste." His own description—and we can leave it at that.

Jay Allen's reactions were different. In fifteen brief pages he has managed a bitter impressionistic portrait of Spain in its century-long struggle for freedom from the medievalism of an Alba, from the fascism of the millionaire contrabandist Juan March. These pages are incandescent. They glow and crackle with the writer's hurt and pity and rage. He makes one feel the somber, ascetic grandeur of the great Castilian plain, the slightly sinister quality of both people and landscape. His pages upon death, as Spain knows it, as its medieval masters carried it to foreign lands, as its modern medievalists are carrying it now to their own vanquished, are appalling. But when he wrote and when Quintinilla made his drawings, though the fascist shadow was lengthening over the land, hope was not all lost. The brave had died or were dying, but perhaps not in vain. Now it is different.

The picture of what has happened is slowly becoming clear, even in these United States. "All the Brave," bitter and illuminating, should etch it deep.

RUTH PIELKOVA

Books and the Wars

IN DEFENCE OF LETTERS. By Georges Duhamel. Translated by E. F. Bozman. The Greystone Press. \$2.75.

LITERATURE is threatened on three fronts. It can be annexed by business; it can be conquered by propaganda; it can be ruined by the competition of the newspaper, the movies, the radio. Against this triple menace Georges Duhamel offers this little book "in defense of letters." His experience is that of a Frenchman, but the problems he discusses are universal; it may be better for us, in order to clarify our thought, to forget the squabbles and the dangers with which we are too familiar at home.

Duhamel is eminently likable. His war books were perhaps the most human of all in that distressing literature. We have properly forgotten that he once picked out America as the nightmarish example of what life might be in the near future. He is sane, and he is, to use one of his favorite words, cordial. He is a kindly man and an honest craftsman. We may add, in no carping spirit: he is thoroughly uninspired. So much the better for his present purpose. No genius is qualified to give advice about the technique, the business, and even the ethics of writing.

I am not so pessimistic as Duhamel about the future of books. At present, it seems, the situation of book writers in France is tragic. In the thick of a depression books are the first luxury that can be thrown overboard; and the class that is hit most disastrously is exactly the one that provided the best public—the intellectual bourgeoisie. Not only do writers find it impossible to live by their pen—it is not at all necessary that they should—but they cannot get their work published at all. The delicate book with limited sales is like the crop on marginal lands: it pays only under the most favorable circumstances. Today it has ceased to pay.

True: but Duhamel himself reminds us that only ten years ago young writers enjoyed insolent prosperity, that they actually had to dodge eager publishers. A very slight change in the business barometer might restore this vanished Golden Age. It would be a miracle if writers shared the privilege of arms manufacturers: to thrive on universal distress.

As for the complaint that "no one reads books any more," it is heard on every side, and yet is contradicted by statistics. The number of titles published every year keeps pretty close to the record-breaking level. Sales, in France as well as in America, reach figures which would have astounded Balzac and Flaubert. We buy more copies of more books than ever; and, to cap the paradox, of longer books. Our streamlined age is also that of monstrously distended novels. It may be that the bourgeois classes read less (the provincial gentry never read much); but the buying public has been vastly increased. It may be that the automobile, the radio, the movie are absorbing an ever-increasing share of our leisure; but technical progress, coupled with economic maladjustment, are providing more leisure than we can intelligently fill.

Duhamel's strongest point in defense of traditional letters is that neither movie nor radio provides a chance for reflection: you are carried inexorably with the stream. Granted: but this is true also of Shakespeare as Shakespeare should be enjoyed, that is to say on the stage. We can discuss a play after

the final curtain; I have known films and radio talks actually to start a train of thought. The tons of fan mail show that interest does not stop as soon as the screen is dark or the radio has signed off.

At any rate, Duhamel's book is exactly what, according to Duhamel, a book should be: it induces reflection. It misses its highest purpose because, although it appears in book form, it is not quite a book. It is a series of very brief essays, usually well under a thousand words, not integrated into a single work. It is very intelligent and very stimulating journalism; it is not quite literature. The Defense of Letters needs and deserves a better-organized, a more sustained effort.

ALBERT GUÉRARD

Totalitarian War

WAR IN OUR TIME. By the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research. Edited by Hans Speier and Alfred Kähler. W. W. Norton and Company. \$3.

SYMPOSIUMS are usually rather drab affairs, largely because they lack plan and organization. But in this book we find collaboration at its best. For the first time an attempt is made to view the impact of modern war and war preparations on society as a whole. And for this purpose the collaboration of a number of experts is essential. No one man could have written "War in Our Time" without years of research and preparation. One wonders that even the graduate faculty of the New School could have done such a thorough job.

Something of the scope of the book can be seen from a few of the chapter headings. They include: Power Politics and Peace Plans, Domestic Policy and Foreign Relations, Problems of Population, Foodstuffs and Raw Materials, The Costs of National Defense, War Finance, War Economics, Morale and Propaganda, and Peace for Our Time. Each subject is handled competently. No important aspect of the war problem as it affects modern society seems to have been omitted, unless it be such sociological problems as the impact of war on the family and social mores. The emphasis is quite properly economic rather than social or political.

As might be expected, the contributors are agreed in regarding fascism, with its totalitarian policies, as the basic cause of the drift toward anarchy and war. In fact, Emil Lederer raises the question whether in the long run totalitarian and democratic states can coexist, to which he replies in the negative. No matter what their personal preferences, the citizens of the democratic states must accept a high degree of totalitarian restriction if they are to defend themselves against nations which are organized solely for war purposes. It is agreed also, however, that fascism, largely because of its emphasis on war, is highly vulnerable economically. It is forced to continual expansion in order to gain greater self-sufficiency, but it does not thereby gain in permanent peace-time stability. Such strength as it has is obtained by a ruthless forcing down of living standards.

Those of us who wish to find a way to prevent the grim horror of dictatorship and war that is so fully pictured in this book may be somewhat disappointed that the authors have not chosen to draw up a detailed peace program. Their failure to do so is probably explained by their conviction, based

on careful analysis of present-day forces, that war is inevitable. Collective security comes in for little more than lip-service, though there is an extended section explaining why it has failed to date. Somewhat more faith is shown in the efficacy of economic measures "short of war." But we are left with a feeling that what is most needed is a complete change in the mentality and morale of the democratic states—they must realize that essentially war has already begun.

MAXWELL S. STEWART

A Fruitful Obsession

PICASSO, MASTER OF THE PHANTOM. By Robert Melville. Oxford University Press. \$1.50.

IN THIS little testimony and "confession" Picasso is a master of the phantom not only in his work but in his effect upon the author, an Englishman who at sixteen was first tormented by the Spanish painter. At eighteen, after six months of writing, Robert Melville was permanently deflected from what he thought was his chosen profession. Ever since—he is now thirty-two—he has been the slave of Picasso.

His book is as personal as his experience. He discusses a good score of paintings, beginning with Picasso's pictures of hunger, in which, he says, "the fragility of his line and the transparency of his color are unsparing aesthetic equivalents for the observed effects of undernourishment." He finds more health in the rose period and greater significance in the cubist, which, he thinks, apprenticed Picasso to a new way of beholding in that he became preoccupied not with the object but with his vision of it—subsequently with a quest for the phantasmal, the recurrently frightful, and what, as in dreams, has no boundaries. Indeed flux itself, or rather an element as it were between the permanent and the dissolving—which relates him to the classic on the one hand and the baroque on the other—has possessed the painter since 1925. This has robbed him of humanity. Finally, in the *Guernica* series the human countenance becomes identical with this fixation of horror. And "we gaze at the ethereal through the lattice of human anguish." Hence the prophylactic function of Picasso for this writer and for the world today. He delineates the contemporary crucifixion of mankind and provides a freer world beyond it. This is a queer,

packed little book, valuable as appreciation and a good instance of what might be called a fruitful obsession.

JEROME MELLQUIST

MUSIC

THERE was, many years ago, a golden age of singing. And there was, only quite recently, what might be called a golden age of orchestral performance: those ten years or so when simultaneously the New York Philharmonic was playing under Toscanini, the Boston Symphony under Koussevitzky, the Philadelphia under Stokowski, each orchestra exceptional in quality of personnel, each highly sensitized to the direction of a conductor exceptional in specific talents for the purpose—the ear for orchestral precision and sonority, the technique and personal force with which to achieve them; each orchestra, then, an instrument with which its conductor produced, in accordance with his individual taste, the distinctive radiance and transparency and sharpness of definition of the New York Philharmonic under Toscanini, the equally distinctive lush sumptuousness and splendor of the Philadelphia under Stokowski, the no less distinctive glow and subtlety and refinement of the Boston Symphony under Koussevitzky—sonorities which were to the sounds of these or any other orchestras under other conductors as the voice of Caruso to the voices of other tenors.

Of the three combinations only that of Koussevitzky with the Boston Symphony is still to be heard regularly, functioning with unimpaired brilliance, and with certain of its most famous achievements more miraculous and breath-taking than ever. Only in his programs has Koussevitzky shown lessened vigor, or perhaps merely the normal tendency of the virtuoso to give an ever higher polish to the works he is most successful with instead of learning an unfamiliar symphony of Haydn. I judge from the programs in New York, and also from those of the summer festivals, which merely transfer to a shed in the Berkshires the most overplayed works of the orchestra's winter repertory in Symphony Hall. Even Bach's B minor Mass, announced for next summer, is standard fare; whereas something out of the ordinary for a festival would be a work like Berlioz's "Childhood of Christ."

Stokowski returned to the Philadelphia Orchestra last season for a mere fortnight in Philadelphia, a single concert in New York, and revealed again his phenomenal talent for conducting—his ability to produce dazzling feats of virtuosity and fabulously beautiful sounds with an orchestra; but also revealed again that what interested him most in conducting was to use the orchestra and music to produce feats of virtuosity and beautiful sounds. They may work out occasionally into something as fine as his performance of the Haydn-Brahms Variations in New York; but more often the result is a performance like the one of Bach's D minor Toccata and Fugue for organ, which reduced the work to a succession of effects for the moment. One of the effects was new: a phrase of the Toccata would begin while the preceding phrase was still fading out. It was, apparently, to think out this that Stokowski had devoted the other fifty weeks of the year;

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and it was for this that Bach had had to wait 200 years, to achieve the full realization of his purpose at last.

As for Toscanini, he conducts the new N. B. C. Symphony which, heard last winter in Newark's Mosque Theater, revealed an improvement in tone and responsiveness that made it a superb instrument in his hands, though still not what the New York Philharmonic had been. His work with his new orchestra is heard in its full beauty only by those who are able to get into the few public concerts. The people who are invited to the broadcasts in N. B. C.'s Studio 8H hear performances deprived of their tonal richness by the studio's acoustic conditions. This N. B. C. admits: the studio, it says, is meant for broadcasting; and it is true that what goes out through the microphones is far better than what can be heard in the studio. But N. B. C. means also that the studio is well adapted to broadcasting; and this is not true. What else can N. B. C. say? A corporation has its pride, like any of us; it has its "face," like the Japanese. Can N. B. C. admit that a studio which is the product of R. C. A.'s financial and engineering resources is not perfection; can it admit that Carnegie Hall, from which the New York Philharmonic is broadcast by Columbia, would be better for the N. B. C. Symphony; can it do anything but stubbornly keep the orchestra in Studio 8H at no matter what cost to Toscanini's broadcasts? True, having insisted after the first season that the studio was perfect, N. B. C. announced before the second season that it had been perfected; and true, it was improved. But when Alfred Wallenstein said in an interview that orchestral performances, including Toscanini's, were not being reproduced perfectly by radio because, in the first place, no substitute had been found for the wood and plaster of Carnegie Hall, and the millions spent on studio walls, floors, and ceilings had therefore not been able to produce anything to equal Carnegie Hall's acoustic excellence, he said what was plain to hear.

Toscanini's performance, then, goes out on the air with a loss due to the acoustics of the studio. It goes out, as Mr. Wallenstein pointed out, with a further loss due to the fact that the stations do not broadcast up to the 12,000 cycles or so which the ear can hear in the living performance; and a loss due to the fact that the lines which connect the stations in a network cannot carry the full volume range of the living performance—a loss, therefore, through monitoring which cuts down the fortissimo of the living performance and steps up the pianissimo, and in this way changes also the plastic proportions of the tonal continuum that are so remarkable in a Toscanini performance. This monitoring, also denied by N. B. C. the first season, was done more skilfully the second; but it was still plain to hear. And finally the performance reaches the ears of the millions outside with a loss due to the deficiencies of most of the radios in American homes. In the end Toscanini conducts but is not heard.

There were, last season, interesting changes in his work that I may discuss later; there were again his appalling choices of music; and there were this time Mr. Chotzinoff's talks, which might have been called "Great Composers as Seen Through the Keyhole"—concerned with the fact that Liszt took a trip to Italy "with the Countess dee Agoult," and Wagner went off with Cosima, and all the rest of what Mr. Chotzinoff thought important about these men and their music.

B. H. HAGGIN



Hungry Children

Drawing by Kathe Kollwitz

"Let All Be for the Child Today and The Child Will Be for All Tomorrow"

There are thousands of orphaned Spanish children still awaiting help in the French refugee centers. Their plight is desperate and if they are to survive they must be taken out of these centers as quickly as possible.

A report just received from France about the children follows.

"For the past six months they have been sleeping on the floor of cafes, barns, stables and deserted factories. Most of them suffer with bronchial coughs.

"They seem to have lost all sense of time and do not know how long they have been in the concentration centers. We have tried to talk to them, but cannot hold their interest for any length of time. We have tried to kiss and pet the little ones, but so unused are they to affection, they pull away, not seeming to understand.

"Their backwardness and lack of feeling is something horrible. It means nothing to them that they have been sleeping on the floor, that they are dirty and that they have had no care and affection. I dare say they had to become like this or they would have perished.

"It will take gentle patience and loving care to bring these young ones 'back to life.'"

The Foster Parents' Plan for Spanish Children has established eight children's colonies near Biarritz, France. Here the children get a fresh start in life, with proper food and clothing and loving care. From the letters and photographs sent to their Foster Parents here in America we know that they are happy.

We need funds immediately to help get the children out of the refugee centers into our colonies. Your aid may decide the fate of a child. Will you help? It is terribly urgent. Starvation does not wait.

ERIC G. MUGGERIDGE,
Executive Secretary.

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Letters to the Editors

To All Active Supporters of Democracy and Peace

Dear Sirs: One of the gravest problems confronting all those engaged in the struggle for democracy and peace, whether they be liberals, progressives, trade unionists, or others, is how to unite their various forces so as to achieve victory for their common goals. The fascists and their allies are well aware that democracy will win if its supporters are united. Accordingly, they are intent on destroying such unity at all costs.

On the international scene the fascists and their friends have tried to prevent a united anti-aggression front by sowing suspicion between the Soviet Union and other nations interested in maintaining peace. On the domestic scene the reactionaries are attempting to split the democratic front by similar tactics. Realizing that here in America they cannot get far with a definitely pro-fascist appeal, they strive to pervert American anti-fascist sentiment to their own ends. With the aim of turning anti-fascist feeling against the Soviet Union they have encouraged the fantastic falsehood that the U. S. S. R. and the totalitarian states are basically alike. By this strategy they hope to create dissension among the progressive forces whose united strength is a first necessity for the defeat of fascism.

Some sincere American liberals have fallen into this trap and unwittingly aided a cause to which they are essentially opposed. Thus, a number of them carelessly lent their signatures to the recent manifesto issued by the so-called Committee for Cultural Freedom. This manifesto denounces in vague, undefined terms all forms of "dictatorship" and asserts that the fascist states and Soviet Russia equally menace American institutions and the democratic way of life.

While we prefer to dwell on facts rather than personalities, we feel it is necessary to point out that among the signers of this manifesto are individuals who have for years had as their chief political objective the maligning of the Soviet people and their government. . . .

A number of other committees have been formed which give lip-service to democracy and peace while actually attacking the Soviet Union and aiding reaction. . . .

The undersigned do not represent any

committee or organization, nor do they propose to form one. Our object is to point out the real purpose behind all these attempts to bracket the Soviet Union with the fascist states, and to make it clear that Soviet and fascist policies are diametrically opposed. To this end we should like to stress ten basic points in which Soviet socialism differs from totalitarian fascism.

1. The Soviet Union continues as always to be a bulwark against war and aggression, and works unceasingly for a peaceful international order.

2. It has eliminated racial and national prejudice within its borders, freed the minority peoples enslaved under the czars, stimulated the culture and economic welfare of these peoples, and made the expression of anti-Semitism or any racial animosity a criminal offense.

3. It has socialized the means of production and distribution through the public ownership of industry and the collectivization of agriculture.

4. It has established nation-wide socialist planning, resulting in increasingly higher living standards and the abolition of unemployment.

5. It has built the trade unions, in which almost 24,000,000 workers are organized, into the very fabric of its society.

6. The Soviet Union has emancipated woman and the family, and has developed an advanced system of child care.

7. From the viewpoint of cultural freedom, the difference between the Soviet Union and the fascist countries is most striking. The Soviet Union has effected one of the most far-reaching cultural and educational advances in all history and among a population which at the start was almost three-fourths illiterate. Those writers and thinkers whose books have been burned by the Nazis are published in the Soviet Union. The best literature from Homer to Thomas Mann, the best thought from Aristotle to Lenin, are available to the masses of the Soviet people. . . .

8. It has replaced the myths and superstitions of old Russia with the truths and techniques of experimental science, extending scientific procedures to every field, from economics to public health.

9. The Soviet Union considers political dictatorship a transitional form and has shown a steadily expanding democracy in every sphere. Its epoch-making

new constitution guarantees Soviet citizens universal suffrage, civil liberties, the right to employment, to leisure, to free education, to free medical care, to material security in sickness and old age, to equality of the sexes in all fields of activity, and to equality of all races and nationalities.

10. In relation to Russia's past, the country has been advancing rapidly along the road of material and cultural progress in ways that the American people can understand and appreciate.

The Soviet Union has an economic system different from our own. But Soviet aims and achievements make it clear that there exists a sound and permanent basis in mutual ideals for co-operation between the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. in behalf of world peace and the security and freedom of all nations.

JAY ALLEN, MARC BLITZSTEIN, MILLEN BRAND, ROBERT A. BRADY, ROBERT M. COATES, KYLE CRICHTON, KENNETH FEARING, IRVING FINEMAN, WALDO FRANK, WANDA GAG, WILLIAM GROPPER, THOMAS H. HARRIS, DASHIELL HAMMETT, GRANVILLE HICKS, MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, GEORGE KAUFMAN, ROCKWELL KENT, ARTHUR KOBER, ALFRED KREYMBORG, PAUL DE KRUIF, CORLISS LAMONT, EMIL LENGYEL, HALFORD E. LUCCOCK, MAX LERNER, ROBERT MORSS LOVETT, GEORGE MARSHALL, ALINE MACMAHON, HARVEY O'CONNOR, CLIFFORD ODETS, SHAEMUS O'SHEEL, S. J. PERELMAN, WALTER RAUTENSTRAUCH, RAYMOND ROBINS, FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, VINCENT SHEEAN, A. E. STEIG, DONALD OGDEN STEWART, MAXWELL S. STEWART, I. F. STONE, LOUIS UNTERMEYER, JAMES THURBER, MARY VAN KLEECK, HARRY F. WARD, WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, and others.

New York, August 10

[We regret that we are able to print only this partial list of signatures. More than 400 names were signed to the letter. In our next issue we plan to print a letter by Goodwin Watson explaining his refusal to sign the letter printed above, with our own editorial comment on the subject.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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